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The Investment Value Standard under
the Railroad Modification Act
Walter J. Blum*

T

HE "investment value" standard of fairness or justness developed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in corporate
readjustments under the Public Utility Holding Company Act'
apparently is being taken over by the Interstate Commerce Commission for use in some corporate readjustments under the Railroad Modification Act.2

In the recent Lehigh Valley proceedings

under the latter act the ICC cited the Supreme Court opinion in
Otis & Co. v. SEC,3 which sanctioned use of the investment value
standard under the Holding Company Act, and then remarked:
. . . the court's decision contemplated valuation of the prop-

erties, for the purpose of determining the values of the rights
of each class of securities, on the basis of a going concern
business and not as though a liquidation were taking place, a
situation similar in that respect to the problem in the proceeding before us. Thus, in our opinion, the standards which we
must apply in this proceeding to insure each class receiving
just compensation for the rights surrendered may differ from
those in a proceeding
contemplating a liquidation of the car4
rier's property.
The use of something like the investment value standard in the
railroad readjustment cases may be justified by the language and
history of the Modification Act.5 With that matter this Comment
is not concerned. However, the quoted portion of the ICC's opinion might carry, as an overtone, the suggestion that the similarity
between situations in which readjustments take place under the
Holding Company Act and situations arising under the Modification Act supports using the same investment value standard in both
types of proceedings. It is that proposition which is to be examined
in this Comment.
A recent article by Hand and Cummings, 6 tracing the development of standards of fairness or justness 7 in various kinds of
readjustment procedures, provides a good background for this
endeavor. Attention is directed primarily to two standards. One
is the "strict priority" or "absolute priority" standard, initiated in
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
1. 49 STAT. 820 (1935), 15 U.S.C. §79k (1946).
2. 62 STAT. 163 (1948), 49 U.S.C. §20b (Supp. 1949).
3. 323 U.S. 624 (1945).
4. 271 I.C.C. 553, 590-91 (1949).
5. See note 2 supra.

6. Consensual Securities Modification, 63 HARv. L. REv. 957 (1950).
7.

Throughout this Comment, the terms "fairness," "justness," "fair," and "just"

are used in a non-technical sense. They are not to be construed as terms of art.
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connection with equity receivership reorganizations, developed
further under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, and currently
applied in reorganizations under Chapter X (and to some extent
under Section 77) of that Act.8 The crux of this standard is that
reorganization is to be treated as a substitute for liquidation, that
all claims of creditors and preferred shareholders are to be treated
as matured as though liquidation were taking place, and that each
class of security holders must receive full compensation for his old
rights before the holders of securities lower in the liquidation
hierarchy may participate in the reorganized entity. Its emphasis
thus is on valuing securities with liquidation rights in the foreground. The other standard is that of "investment value" or "present value" of securities. This was developed with respect to readjustments under the Holding Company Act. The heart of this
standard is that the rights of the various classes of security holders are to be valued "on the basis of a going business and not as
though a liquidation were taking place." 9 From this it follows that
liquidation preferences are "only one factor in valuation rather
than determinative of amounts payable."1 0
Although the investment value standard was initially advanced
as being only an application of absolute priority in a special situation, i1 the difference between the two sets of guides for allocating
securities in a readjustment is easily delineated. The valuation
placed on an enterprise for purposes of a capital readjustment may
fall short of the aggregate liquidation preferences of its senior
securities. Even so, its junior securities may have present value
if the company's anticipated earnings exceed the amount required
to service its senior securities while they are outstanding. This
value rests on the right of the company to continue using the
capital obtained through issuance of the senior securities. That
right, and the value of junior securities arising from it, end if
liquidation preferences are treated as matured; for then the position of junior security-holders is to be reassessed as though the
capital raised through the senior issues were to be "repaid" in
2
accordance with such preferences.'
8. 47

STAT.

1474 (1933)

as amended, 11 U.S.C. §205 (1946).

9. Schwabacker v. U.S., 336 U.S. 182, 199 (1948).
10. Ibid.
11. See supra note 6, at p. 975; Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308
U.S. 106 (1939).
12. "A concrete, if greatly oversimplified, illustrative situation may be of assistance in showing the differences in results under a standard of present value of
securities and a strict priority criterion. In receivership or bankruptcy under the
strict priority approach, the holder of a first mortgage bond has the right to be
paid his $1,000 of principal before anything can be given to the holders of second
mortgage bonds. This means that unless the value of the debtor's assets is more
than enough to pay the senior lien bonds there is really no value in any junior
security. But in a readjustment, while liquidation rights affect present value, they
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There is a sound reason, apart from statutory language and
history, for adopting the investment value standard in readjustments under the Holding Company Act. Professor Dodd has stated
that reason in examining the position of the preferred shareholders
of United Light & Power Company, the holding company whose readjustment gave rise to the Otis case and thus was the vehicle for
judicial sanction of the investment value standard. He points out
that if it were not for the enactment of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act, preferred shareholders would not have had any
matured claim on the assets or the choice, under the Act, of a
method for simplification. In effect, the Securities and Exchange
Commission gives literal import to the liquidation aspects of a
contract made by the preferred shareholders who had acquired
such shares without anticipation of such possibility of a Congressional policy of simplification. 13
Does this or a comparable reason support using the investment
value standard in readjustments under the Modification Act? An
intermediate inquiry may provide a useful stepping-stone. Reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act generally is "the reconstruction of an enterprise that is to continue and not the disposition
of a defunct venture.' 14 Why, then, is it not sound to apply the
investment value standard to Chapter X reorganizations? 15 (This
is not entirely a fanciful question. A commentator has recently
remarked, "Whether the investment value method will carry over
into bankruptcy reorganizations cannot now be determined with
any finality . . .") '6 Professor Dodd gives a sufficient answer to
this question. He states that though reorganization of insolvent
corporations does not ordinarily involve liquidation of the business,
the reason for maturation of creditors priorities are independent
of any actions based on statutory provisions for reorganization
are not decisive. The first mortgage bondholder has no claim for principal amount;
his right is to receive interest until maturity, at which time he will be entitled to

repayment of principal. The present worth of his security is the value of this
mortgage bonds may have a value of $750 each and the second mortgage bonds
$250. To apply the present value method of treatment to this situation would
mean that the new or altered securities to be held after the readjustment should
continue to be in this three-to-one ratio of value. Strict priority is meaningless here
because there is no hierarchy of priority to be observed; as to present value all
securities are on the same plane and differ only in their relative worth." Hand
long-term right against the particular obligator. Under this approach, the first

and Cummings, Consensual Securities Modification, 63 HAv.L. Ray. 957, 975 at
n. 65 (1950).
13. Note, Dissolution Preferences and Public Utility Holding Company Act

Simplifications-The Otis Case, 58 HARv. L. REv. 604, 608 (1945).
14. See note 12 supra.
15. See note 8 supra.
16. Note, Corporations:Public Utility Holding Company Act: Effect of Liquidation of Holding Company on Shareholders' Charter Preferences: Investment Value
Theory: SEC v. Central Illinois Securities Corporation, 35 Cornell L. Q. 406, 414
(1950).
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but, in fact, mature because of the company's financial weakness.
The bankruptcy act, in permitting reorganization instead of requiring liquidation, does not depart from the theory that creditors are
entitled to "payment" at a particular time or upon the occurrence
of a default. Thus, "instead of requiring liquidation, the law
permits reorganization as a substitute. Reorganization prevents
creditors from getting the cash for which they bargained but the
absolute priority doctrine comes to their rescue by giving them
the nearest practicable equivalent."' 17
In other words, the very reason for using the investment
value standard in Holding Company Act situations constitutes
a cogent reason for not using it in bankruptcy reorganizations.
Readjustment to comply with the dictates of the Holding Company Act should not be an occasion for senior investors to get the
benefits of their rights relating to default and liquidation, inasmuch
as such rights were acquired by senior investors in order to protect their investments in the event the corporation in which they
invested did not prosper. To ignore or minimize the value of these
rights when a distressed corporation seeks reorganization in place
of liquidation is to deprive senior investors of the protection (or
its equivalent) which they particularly sought in acquiring their
securities. It is conceivable that Congress in the future might
decide to replace the strict priority standard with another one in
bankruptcy reorganizations. But whatever may be the policy behind such a change, it cannot be justified by the fallacious explanation that default and liquidation rights incorporated in senior
securities are without significance when distressed enterprises are
reorganized instead of liquidated.
This intermediate analysis establishes a basis for considering
whether the reason for using the investment value standard under
the Holding Company Act also justifies employing it under the
Modification Act. Railroads which are not in distress and do
not anticipate being in distress may wish to proceed under the
Modification Act to reform outmoded indentures and similar
instruments. But the Act certainly was not designed primarily
to cope with cases of that nature. Its legislative history and
structure reveal clearly that the dominant motif was readjustment of railroad securities in anticipation of financial distress.
Specifically, the proponents of the legislation desired a medium
by which a railroad anticipating difficulties in meeting fixed
interest charges could have these reduced or made contingent
on earnings, and a railroad anticipating difficulties in retiring
or refinancing a maturing bond issue could have the maturity
17. See note 13 supra.
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date extended.' 8 Railroads faced with such difficulties are not
apt to be roads which are prospering. They are much more likely
to be roads whose earnings are falling short of expectations since
it is the failure to achieve expectations which compels readjustment.
In these circumstances it seems unreasonable to ignore or greatly
minimize the value of default and liquidations rights. The need
for modification of securities is itself a pretty good indication
that more than passing attention should be paid to the protective
features in securities.
This is not to argue that it is unsound to treat liquidation and
and default rights as being not matured in proceedings under
the Modification Act. Rather this is to point out, first, that the
situation giving rise to such a readjustment is likely to be essentially
different from that involved in a Holding Company Act readjustment; and, second, that the difference has a direct bearing on
what constitutes a fair or just standard for allocating securities
in the readjustments. It may be fair to practically ignore liquidation and default rights in the Holding Company Act cases, but no
comparable reason exists for doing so when a weak or weakening
railroad seeks to readjust its capital structure. To measure the
investment value of securities in such a road without emphasizing
the value of default and liquidation rights is to dilute the contracts
of preferred shareholders and bondholders in order to preserve
the equity of the common shareholders. A reductio ad absurdum
statement of this relationship might be useful: If the value of default and liquidation rights is to be minimized in determining
present values of securities, then as the affairs of the railroad
further deteriorate, the value of senior securities relative to
common shares will further decrease.
There remains for consideration the almost wholly terminological
question whether existing notions of the investment value standard
preclude giving great weight to the value of liquidation and default
rights in ascertaining present values of securities. The usual statements of the standard do not contain such a limitation: "priorities
as to both earnings and assets are, of course, to be considered
in ascertaining investment value."' 19 Moreover, the Hand and
Cummings article, mentioned previously, notes that "In some proceedings under [the Modification Act], . . . which specifically
contemplates employment of [the Act] by railroads in bankruptcy
or receivership on the effective date of the Act, the [ICC] might
wish to give greater than usual weight to factors such as potential
18. See note 6 supra.
19. Id. at 979, n. 71.
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liquidation claims in determining justness and reasonableness...,,*o
Thus it seems that, despite the differences between the atmosphere
in which Holding Company Act cases take place and that in which
Modification Act cases are likely to take place, the thrust of the
investment value standard can be applied to both without disturbing accepted terminology. But it is well to remember that
any standard of fairness or justness in allocating securities in a
readjustment is nothing more than a set of guides to control
negotiations of the parties and the discretion of officials. 21 If the
analysis set forth in this Comment is sound, it seems especially
important to remember this fact in connection with using the
investment value standard in railroad readjustments under the
Modification Act.
20. Id. at 973.
21. See Blum, The Law and Language of CorporateReorganization,17 UNIV. oF
CI. L. REv. 565 (1950).
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